First, allow me to thank Hugo Pereira and the entire team at 'ElConstitucional.es' for embarking on this journey today, a path I hope will be a long one, and in which they have wanted to count on me, on my contribution, which will be—I hope—once a week, when I meet with you in this video blog and also in an opinion article. I would like to start with something that has been the news that has kept us all immersed in analysis for several days, for over a week now. There are moments in the life of political parties when *not deciding* is also deciding. And there are rarer ones, it's true, in which deciding badly is equivalent to disappearing. **And, you will see, the Popular Party is in one of those moments today.** Since **Donald Trump's emergence as a destabilizing factor in the international order**, the PP has been experiencing an increasingly visible internal tension. It is not tactical, it is not circumstantial, it is not a nuance of discourse. It is what we could consider a genuine ideological fracture. On one side, sectors of the party that look with sympathy or directly with enthusiasm at *Trumpism*; sectors close to Vox, imbued with its language, its aesthetics, and its contempt—why not say it?—for international law. **Figures like the president of the Community of Madrid, Isabel Díaz Ayuso**, are positioned there, not hiding their political and cultural alignment with Trump and with that whole world of the so-called MAGA movement. On the other side, a very different tradition of the Popular Party as a party of state. A tradition embodied today by veterans like **José Manuel García-Margallo**, like former ambassador Javier Rupérez, or like FAES itself, the foundation chaired by José María Aznar. People who know about international politics, who have represented Spain in the world, and who understand something essential: that without international legality, there is no security for medium-sized countries like ours. This is not a minor discussion; it is a discussion about what the Popular Party is and why it exists. The PP was born and grew as the heir to the European center-right that emerged from World War II with a very clear conviction: never again the law of the strongest, never again unilateralism, never again force over law. That international liberal order—the UN, NATO, the European Union, international law—is not a moral whim; it is the safety net for democracies, and especially for democracies that are not superpowers. That is why uncritical support for Trump is not only an ethical error, it is strategic suicide. **Trump does not represent liberalism.** Trump represents the exact opposite of liberalism: **contempt for rules, humiliation of the weak, the use of power as intimidation, and the substitution of law with force**. A party like the Popular Party cannot afford complacency with that without ceasing to be what it has been, because the day the PP renounces defending international legality, it also renounces its legitimacy as a governing party. And here comes the truly serious part. If the Popular Party adopts the mindset of Trumpism, if it buys into the idea that the end justifies the means, that sovereignty is relative, that international law is a hindrance, then I ask myself the question: *how does it differ from Vox?* The answer is uncomfortable, but inevitable: it differs in almost nothing. **And when a center-right party becomes a moderate copy of the extreme right, history is clear: it ends up disappearing, either devoured or irrelevant.** This has already happened in other countries: it has happened to the classic right in Italy, it has happened to conservative sectors in France, and it is happening to the American Republicans. Alberto Núñez Feijóo is probably facing the most difficult decision of his leadership, much more so than a failed investiture or a parliamentary strategy. He has to decide whether the PP wants to continue being a party of state or become a party of the trenches. And making the wrong choice here has no turning back, because parties that renounce the principles that gave them meaning may win a momentary cultural battle, without a doubt, but they lose the future: they empty themselves from within, they stop representing broad majorities, and they end up becoming satellites of more radical forces. **The PP cannot afford that mistake, not out of nostalgia or aesthetics, but for political survival.** Defending international legality, the liberal order, and democratic values is not naivety; it is political realism. Renouncing them is condemning oneself to cease being a governing alternative in Spain. This is one of those moments when history takes attendance, and the PP has to decide whether it wants to remain in it or disappear from the right side.