A part of the electorate that voted PP in 23J does not consider Alberto Núñez Feijóo as their “preferred president” and, furthermore, declares today their voting intention towards Vox or indecision between the two. In other words: the PP faces a problem of leadership and block cohesion, with a right-wing where three personal brands compete (Feijóo, Ayuso, and Abascal) and where the “price” of the right-wing shift of the message does not seem to translate into absorbing Vox, but rather into an ever-increasing hemorrhage from the PP to its right.
- Among those who remember voting PP in the 23J, Feijóo does not monopolize the preference for president: Ayuso and Abascal capture, together, a share comparable to one third of the "potential leadership" of the space.
- In declared voting intention, the PP→Vox transfer and the pool of undecided/non-voters add up to seven-figure magnitudes if projected onto the actual result of the 23J, and anticipate a *sorpasso* on the right.
- The contrast with Pedro Sánchez is structural: not only does he dominate among socialist voters, but he appears as the preferred candidate by relevant percentages in electorates of other parties, acting as the "focal candidate" of the progressive bloc.
1) Key indicator: “preferred president” within the electorate itself (leadership exclusivity index)
The CIS asks openly who is preferred as President of the Government and publishes the recalculated version “only among those who mention someone specific” (P18Ra). There appears the first critical data: among those who remember having voted PP in 2023, Feijóo is the preferred one by 59.0%. But Isabel Díaz Ayuso reaches 16.2% and Abascal 13.9% within that same electorate.
In terms of leadership structure, this means that the PP does not operate with an "exclusive" leadership (a candidate who almost hegemonically concentrates the presidential preference of its base), but with a "shared/contestable" leadership. And what is important is not only that there are internal alternatives (Díaz Ayuso), but that the external alternative (Abascal) has comparable traction among voters who declare having voted PP, and it is maintained even among those who claim they will vote PP again even though they prefer other candidates like Abascal as president.
The equivalent indicator for the PSOE, in the same CIS, but consistent with the average of all published polls shows a very different picture: among those who remember voting PSOE, Sánchez is preferred by 77.5% (P18Ra). That difference (59.0 vs 77.5) is, in terms of applied political science, a gap in leadership's "closing capacity": Sánchez closes ranks; Feijóo does not.
2) The "inter-bloc" comparison: Sánchez as a transversal candidate vs. Feijóo as a segmented candidate
The same P18Ra chart adds a second element: Sánchez not only dominates his base; he appears as the preferred candidate by significant quotas in non-socialist electorates. In February 2026, among those who recall voting for Sumar, Sánchez ranks at 36.3%; among those who recall ERC, 59.6%; in Junts, 70.9%; in EH Bildu, 57.2%; and in PNV, 72.6%.
This does not mean "PSOE vote", but it does configure Sánchez as the focal candidate of the progressive/plurinational bloc when the electorate thinks about the presidency. It is exactly the pattern that usually stabilizes a leader in multiparty systems: even if there is intra-bloc competition for votes, intra-bloc competition for the "Moncloa candidacy" is reduced.
Instead, the PP appears in an inverse scheme: intrablock competition for leadership (Ayuso inside; Abascal outside) becomes visible within its own base.
3) Transition matrix in declared vote: PP→Vox defection + undecided/non-vote pool (900,000 votes in dispute)
The CIS also publishes the cross-tabulation of "which party would you vote for" (P20R) by recall of vote on 23J, and it is consistent with other polling firms like Sigma2. There, among 23J PP voters:
— 65.7% declare they would vote PP today.
— 16.2% declare they would vote Vox today.
— 9.5% "don't know yet".
— 1.7% "would not vote".
If we project the indecision/non-vote onto the actual result of the PP in the 23J (8,160,837 votes), the sum of "don't know yet" (9.5%) + "would not vote" (1.7%) equates to 914,000 voters. This is the order of magnitude that could trigger the hemorrhage of voters "gifted" to VOX by the PP above two million, which would propel the *sorpasso* in the reactionary bloc and place Santiago Abascal as a candidate for the presidency of the Government ahead of Feijóo, as a significant percentage of his own voters and the vast majority of VOX voters intend.
And the other, even more disruptive figure is the declared PP→Vox defection: that 16.2% projected onto 23J is equivalent to 1.32 million voters (an indicative magnitude, but politically very expressive).
4) The electoral context: Vox approaches PP in estimation and the "tough" strategy does not stop the bleeding
In the February 2026 barometer itself, the CIS estimation places PSOE first (32.6%), PP second (22.9%), and Vox third (18.9%), with Vox being four points behind PP. The majority of other polling firms do not agree on the overrepresentation of PSOE, but they do agree on the phenomenon of Feijóo's weak leadership and the preference for other political figures among their own voters.
Beyond the CIS, the PP–Vox competition photo also appears in recent private polls: for example, one by 40dB published on 02/10/2026 placed Vox around 18% at the expense of the PP, and although with different methodologies and still maintaining the PP's forecast as the winner, it underlines the same intra-bloc trend: the PP is bleeding from the right.
What is relevant for a strategy investigation is not "who goes first" in each house, but the mechanism: the CIS allows us to see that the hardening of the framework (migration, security, identity) does not automatically translate into "absorbing Vox", as we anticipated in El Constitucional with data from the average of published polls, because a large part of the popular electorate interprets that, if the agenda becomes "Vox-ized", the original is more credible than the copy. The P20R data (16.2% of the PP's 23J voters declaring for Vox today) is the most direct indicator of this mechanism. And the indecision data between the two reinforces the trend towards a *sorpasso*.
5) Operational conclusion: Feijóo not only loses votes; he loses the "ownership" of the right-wing leadership
The set of indicators draws a coherent pattern:
- Non-exclusive leadership at its base (Feijóo 59%; Ayuso 16.2%; Abascal 13.9% as "preferred president" among PP voters).
- Material uncertainty pool (914,000 among undecided and potential abstention, projecting P20R on the real PP vote in 2023): If VOX captures the majority consolidating the current trend, Feijóo could aspire to the vice-presidency of a possible reactionary coalition government.
- Declared flight towards Vox of millionaire magnitude (indicative projection of 16.2%).
- Opposite, a leader (Sánchez) who not only concentrates his own (77.5% among PSOE voters) but also acts as a focal candidate for allied electorates (Sumar, ERC, Junts, Bildu, PNV).
In terms of a "model", the PP would be simultaneously suffering: (a) a drop in voting loyalty, (b) a double internal and intra-bloc competition for leadership, and (c) a perverse strategic incentive: the closer it gets to the hard agenda, the less differential it has left to justify why Feijóo and not Abascal (and, internally, why Feijóo and not Ayuso). The latest polls offer sufficient quantitative material to support this thesis with primary and replicable data.