The documents dismantle the hoax of ultra agitator Vito Quiles about Ceuta: the CNI warned of the dissemination, never of a massive entry

The ultra agitator Vito Quiles and other right-wing and far-right accounts began to spread this Wednesday that the National Intelligence Center (CNI) warned the Government of a "massive entry" into Ceuta at 1:52 p.m. on July 29, one day before the border crisis began.

The statement distorts the content of the declassified documents. The CNI warned that a call was circulating to attempt to enter by sea and over the fence, identified the groups where it was being disseminated, and warned of the expected date. In none of the published messages did it use the expression "massive entry" or calculate how many people might participate.

The full conversation disseminated by the Government shows that the CNI wrote to the Government Delegation in Ceuta at 1:52 p.m. "On social media there is a call for an assault by fence and sea tomorrow at 8 p.m.," it communicated. It also explained that the organizers intended to take advantage of Morocco's Throne Day and that its Security Forces and Corps would be occupied.

Intelligence added that it had located "two different groups with a total of 180,000 followers", but immediately clarified the meaning of that figure. "To give you an idea of the reach of the dissemination," it wrote. The 180,000 were followers potentially exposed to the call, not an estimate of people prepared to cross the border.

The Delegation responded to the message and both parties held an eleven-minute call at 9:34 p.m. The documentation confirms the contact, although it does not reproduce its content.

One minute after the first warning, at 1:53 p.m., the CNI tried to locate Central Special Unit number 3 (UCE-3) of the Civil Guard. After an unanswered call, it sent another message in which it spoke of "an attempt at entries by swimming and jumping the fence" and of several Facebook and WhatsApp groups that were incentivizing these movements. At 2:41 p.m., a seven-minute and 38-second phone conversation finally took place.

The intelligence service sent that same afternoon an urgent note to its Moroccan counterparts about the planning of several calls to access Ceuta during the Feast of the Throne. Nor did that document anticipate the arrival of tens of thousands of people or offer a forecast about the magnitude the crisis would eventually reach.

The alert about "massive entries" came from the National Police

The expression attributed by Quiles to the CNI does appear in another of the published documents, but its author is the National Immigration and Borders Center (CENIF) of the National Police.

An internal note dated July 29 states that communications had been detected in migrant groups trying to organize "massive entries" combining land and swimming access to cause "the greatest possible collapse". The report analyzed the risk of a massive jump and placed sea crossings as the main immediate threat.

CENIF subsequently developed three scenarios for July 30. It considered a swimming entry highly probable, gave a medium probability to the combination of sea and fence jumping, and rated the risk of a coordinated action by both routes as "EXTREME", although it assigned a medium-low probability to this last scenario.

As 'ElConstitucional.es' has published when analyzing the declassified messages, the previous warnings allow us to confirm that the institutions were aware of the existence of calls, the increase in migratory pressure, and the risk of coordinated attempts. The documents also do not show that the CNI anticipated the arrival of more than 70,000 people between July 30 and 31.

The Intelligence warning was specific about the date, the possible access routes, and the extent of dissemination on networks. Converting the 180,000 followers of two groups into the magnitude foreseen for the assault alters what the message said. The CNI warned of a call; the one who wrote "massive entries" was the CENIF of the National Police.