Adif's control center in Atocha authorized the AVE to resume circulation with "normal speed" at 8:36 AM this Wednesday. Twelve minutes later, the Iryo train driver reported that she could not restart her safety system and remained stopped before the Urda entry signal. Shortly after, the Renfe train hit the Iryo convoy from behind in the Toledo accident that has left at least 68 dead.
The transcripts of the communications, consulted by 'ElConstitucional.es', allow reconstructing the orders transmitted after the failure of the LZB, the protection system that continuously monitors the train's movement. They include queries and doubts within the control room before authorizing circulation. They also document the subsequent warning that the Iryo remained stopped on the track.
The first conversation begins at 8:31 AM, when the driver of AVE 2080 contacts Atocha due to loss of transmission. From the control center, they ask if he has a stopping point and a target speed of zero. The driver responds yes. "It's just that the Urda central station has gone down," they explain, before asking him to wait while they assess how to proceed.
During that exchange, queries about the disconnection and reconnection of the equipment follow. "Wait a moment, we are getting confused because they say they are going to fix it," the transcript states. A "it's going to fail again" also appears among the indications and background conversations.
At 8:36 AM, the authorization is formulated. "Driver of train 2080, disconnect and reconnect the LZB and resume movement under the protection of the BSL with normal speed." The acronym BSL corresponds to the lateral signaling block, which regulates circulation using signals installed alongside the track.
Iryo reported that it was still stopped
The next communication corresponds to Iryo 6076. Its driver reports a loss of transmission and explains that she is stopped before the Urda entry signal. From Atocha, they check her position and process a new notification. At 8:41 AM, they also transmit the instruction to disconnect and reconnect the LZB to resume circulation with "normal speed."
However, the Iryo remains stopped. At 8:48, the train driver contacts the control center again. "The train is not allowing me to restart the LZB system," she communicates, specifying that she remains stopped before the entry signal. From Atocha, they acknowledge receipt of the warning and instruct her to call again if she has problems.
That exchange informs the control center that the Iryo had not been able to continue. The investigation will have to reconstruct what decisions were adopted after receiving that warning and what communications were maintained with the AVE that was circulating behind. Traffic records and recordings will allow examining the complete sequence during the minutes preceding the impact.
The order that the judge is already investigating under seal
The Minister of Transport, Óscar Puente, has placed the authorization to circulate normally at the center of his first explanations about the accident. As he has explained, the existing conditions required applying visual driving, with a maximum speed of 40 kilometers per hour, instead of the order transmitted to the AVE. This regime requires advancing at a speed that allows the train to stop before an obstacle.
Puente has described as "inexplicable" that the resumption of circulation was authorized when there was another train stopped and a red signal. The investigation examines both the initial failure of the protection system and the traffic management during that incident and the instructions received by the drivers.
The judge of court number 2 of the Civil and Instruction Section of the Court of First Instance of Orgaz has decreed this Wednesday the secrecy of the proceedings. She has also ordered the Judicial Police to seize and guard the black boxes of the trains found for their subsequent analysis.
The instructing judge has ordered to collect in the Atocha control center the circulation data and information about the people in charge of command at the time of the accident. In addition, she has requested Adif for the protocols and actions before, during and after the crash, and has restricted access to the accident area and the removal of elements to preserve the evidence.
