Prevarication, embezzlement and disloyal administration: the possible crimes that hover over Planifica Madrid due to the controversial purchase of the penthouse for Ayuso

The purchase of the luxury penthouse in Chamberí has ceased to be solely a political problem for Isabel Díaz Ayuso. The operation carried out by Planifica Madrid has already reached the Prosecutor's Office, the courts, and the Court of Accounts through various complaints requesting clarification on whether the public company committed crimes of prevarication, embezzlement, disloyal administration, or document forgery.

The PSOE of Madrid filed a complaint this Friday with the Economic Crimes Prosecutor's Office against the board of directors of Planifica Madrid. The socialists demand an investigation into who ordered the acquisition, which individuals authorized it, and what documents supported the disbursement of 6.3 million euros.

The complaint joins the one filed by Fernando Jabonero, former socialist councilor and anti-corruption activist, before the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Madrid. It points to possible crimes of administrative prevarication, embezzlement, and document forgery. The Iustitia Europa party has also gone to court, while lawyer Javier Flores has brought the operation before the Court of Accounts for the possible existence of accounting liability. Más Madrid has requested the intervention of the auditing bodies and has announced new actions.

So far, there is no public record of a judge or the Prosecutor's Office having opened criminal proceedings against a specific person. The complaints also do not, by themselves, prove the commission of any crime. Their content points to the decisions and documents that must be examined to determine how almost 6.7 million public euros were used between the price of the property and the taxes on the operation.

Planifica Madrid bought a 485-square-meter penthouse located on Paseo del General Martínez Campos on April 14. The home has a terrace of about 200 meters, five bedrooms, six bathrooms, a private cinema, two parking spaces, and two storage rooms. The real estate agency Promora advertised it for 6.6 million, and the public company ended up paying 6.3 million, to which it added 378,000 euros for the property transfer tax.

The operation was not included in the regional budgets for 2026, in the public reports of Planifica Madrid nor in its transparency portal. Neither the appraisal, the necessity report, the analysis of other alternatives, the agreement of the board of directors, nor the deed of sale have been disclosed. The company has refused to provide several of these documents to the opposition, citing their commercial nature.

The absence of the public file is especially relevant because the explanations of the Madrid Government have been changing. First, the penthouse was presented as a provisional office for Ayuso during future works in the Real Casa de Correos. Those works are not yet tendered and have no start date. Later, there was talk of a space for institutional meetings. Later, the Minister of the Presidency and president of Planifica Madrid, Miguel Ángel García Martín, raised the possibility that Madrid could have an official residence for its president.

Urban planning regulations complicate all these options. The property has residential use and is located on a floor where offices or administrative endowment units are not allowed to be installed. Antonio Giraldo, socialist spokesperson for Urban Planning in the Madrid City Council, has explained that an official residence provides a public service and requires an endowment use, different from that of an ordinary dwelling. Enrique Manzano, spokesperson for Renovation of the Official College of Architects of Madrid, also considers this destination unfeasible because administrative uses are only allowed up to the first floor in this building.

The Executive finally announced that it will sell the penthouse and allocate the proceeds, along with those from offices on Gran Vía, to the reconstruction of the municipalities affected by the fires in the Sierra Oeste. The decision came after the purchase was published by the media, just four months after the operation was signed.

Prevarication depends on an order that has not yet appeared

The crime of administrative prevarication punishes the authority or public official who consciously issues an arbitrary resolution in an administrative matter. Article 404 of the Penal Code establishes a penalty of between nine and fifteen years of special disqualification from public employment or office.

Lack of transparency or deficient management of a public company are not enough to appreciate this crime. The Prosecutor's Office would need to locate a resolution, an order, or an agreement that was contrary to law and demonstrate that those responsible knew of this arbitrariness when they acted.

Here appears one of the main legal obstacles. Planifica Madrid is a public commercial company that is partially governed by private law. Real estate sales, moreover, are excluded from the Public Sector Contracts Law as patrimonial contracts. This exclusion does not grant absolute freedom to spend public money. The company must respect its statutes, its internal procedures, and the principles of efficiency, control, transparency, and protection of the heritage of the Community of Madrid.

The PSOE maintains that the commercial form could have been used to circumvent the controls provided for in the Heritage Law of the Community of Madrid. To verify this, it will be necessary to know whether the purchase originated within Planifica Madrid or responded to an order from the Ministry of the Presidency, the General Directorate of Heritage, or another body of the regional Executive.

The jurist Javier Flores believes that prevarication presents a more difficult fit as long as an administrative resolution does not appear. That scenario would change if the documentation demonstrates that there was an external order or a commission to acquire the penthouse outside the required procedures.

The board of directors was chaired by Miguel Ángel García Martín when the purchase occurred. The official organizational chart also includes the CEO, Pedro Corbalán Ruiz, and the members José Antonio Sánchez Serrano, Lourdes Ríos Zaldívar, Pablo García-Valdecasas Rodríguez de Rivera, Ramón Cubián Martínez, José Tortosa de la Iglesia, Javier Carazo Gil, and Eusebio González Castilla.

Membership of the board does not automatically make all its members criminally liable. The minutes will have to show who attended the meeting, how the vote was cast, what information each director received, and whether any objections were raised. It must also be clarified whether the body formally approved the purchase before it was signed before a notary.

The institutional agenda of Planifica Madrid suffered a striking void around the operation. The last board meeting published before the case became known appeared dated March 25. After the initial information, the company began to incorporate new annotations, including a notarial signature from April 16. This late update does not demonstrate falsity, although it reinforces the need to check the original dates of the documents and their correspondence with the decisions adopted.

The possible harm opens the door to disloyal administration

Disloyal administration appears as one of the criminal avenues with the greatest capacity to adapt to the known facts. Article 252 of the Penal Code punishes whoever has powers to administer another's assets, exceeds them, and causes economic harm.

To sustain this accusation, it will be necessary to demonstrate that Planifica Madrid paid an unjustified price, acquired a property useless for the announced purpose, or assumed costs that a diligent manager would have avoided. The basic penalty can range from six months to three years in prison and increases when aggravating circumstances provided for frauds of special amount or gravity concur.

The complaints handle an alleged overcost of 61% compared to the market price. This figure still needs independent proof. The accessible documentation shows that the penthouse was advertised for 6.6 million and bought for 6.3 million. The advertised price also does not equate to an official appraisal. To prove harm, it will be necessary to compare the dwelling with truly equivalent properties, examine its condition, value the garages, storage rooms, and terrace, and know the appraisal used by Planifica Madrid. The lack of such an appraisal prevents presenting 61% as a proven overprice. It also leaves open the most important question for the criminal procedure: what criterion did the administrators follow to consider the outlay of 6.3 million reasonable.

Planifica Madrid's Budgets for 2026 also did not include the acquisition of the penthouse. The accounts included an investment of 38.37 million in land promotion and, within that, an item of 1,040,518 euros for land purchase. This latter amount does not constitute the company's total budget, although it serves to measure the distance between the planned real estate operations and the expenditure made in Chamberí. The price of the penthouse multiplied that item by more than six and did not appear identified in any public forecast.

Embezzlement requires additional elements. Buying a property that becomes the property of a public company does not in itself mean appropriating public money. The Penal Code, however, contemplates several behaviors. The appropriation of public assets for profit can be punished with penalties of two to six years in prison, which increase when the damage exceeds 50,000 euros. The private use of public goods and their application to a different public purpose than that for which they were intended is also sanctioned.

The possible use of the penthouse as Ayuso's private residence, raised in some complaints, would have to be proven through documents, orders, reforms, or specific preparations. The president has denied that the property was intended for her personal use. The characteristics of the property and the versions offered by the Government allow this hypothesis to be investigated, although they are insufficient to attribute the crime.

It must also be analyzed whether the property was bought for an institutional purpose that was never possible. Urban planning regulations prevent its use as an administrative office or official residence under the announced conditions. If those responsible knew of this limitation before authorizing the expenditure, the operation could acquire a different dimension to determine the existence of damage.

The announced sale also does not close the problem. Its result will show whether Planifica Madrid recovers the 6.3 million, loses part of the money, or even makes a profit. To that account must be added the 378,000 euros paid in taxes and the rest of the expenses associated with the acquisition and subsequent transfer.

The money from the sale will remain, in any case, within Planifica Madrid. To incorporate it into the regional budget, there would have to be a distribution of dividends or another legal mechanism. The company has not distributed dividends for ten years. The last operation occurred in June 2016, when it delivered 23 million charged to voluntary reserves.

At the close of 2025, these reserves amounted to 5.7 million. The 2026 budget foresees a profit close to eight million, far from the 20 or 22 million that the Government claims it will be able to mobilize with the sale of the penthouse and the Gran Vía offices. The latter already went on the market in 2025 for 14.2 million with taxes, and the tender was deserted.

The 2026 profits could not be ordinarily distributed until the approval of the accounts in 2027. An interim dividend would require demonstrating sufficient liquidity and that the generated results allow the payment to be made. The Madrid government has not yet detailed what formula it intends to use.

Ayuso and pending responsibilities

Criminal responsibilities will have to be individualized. Planifica Madrid executed the operation, but investigators must determine which individuals made each decision. The Penal Code allows public officials to be considered those who participate in public functions by appointment of an authority, even if they work within a commercial company.

Ayuso's responsibility would depend on the appearance of evidence linking her to the purchase order, the choice of the property, or an eventual private use. Being president of the Community of Madrid and the highest political authority of the Executive does not automatically transfer the acts of the board of directors to her. An indictment would require proving that she ordered, induced, knew, or collaborated significantly in a criminal act.

Ayuso has disassociated her office from the acquisition and has referred explanations to Miguel Ángel García Martín. The counselor maintains that Planifica Madrid carries out real estate operations as part of its usual activity and that the purchase met institutional needs. The known data show that the company had only acquired two properties in the last six years: its own headquarters and the house of the poet Vicente Aleixandre.

The possible documentary falsehood included in Fernando Jabonero's complaint will also require concrete evidence. The delay in publishing an agenda or the absence of documentation on the transparency portal do not in themselves constitute a criminal falsehood. A manipulated act, a report dated after the decision, a fabricated justification, or consciously false economic information would have to appear.

The Prosecutor's Office now has several coinciding requests. The complainants demand the complete purchase and sale file, the board minutes, the appraisal, the legal and economic reports, the urban planning documentation, internal communications, the identity of those who negotiated with the real estate company, and studies on the works of the Puerta del Sol.

These papers will allow knowing when the operation was born and what purpose was stated before paying for the penthouse. They will also show whether the directors were warned of urban planning restrictions, whether they compared other properties, and whether the decision to sell was adopted for economic reasons or as a response to the publication of the case.

The first decisive action is contained in that file that Planifica Madrid has not yet made public. It must state who wanted to buy the penthouse, what they wanted it for, and why they considered it justified to spend 6.3 million euros from a company owned by all Madrid residents.