The phased strategy of Sánchez in the face of the humanitarian crisis in Ceuta, under examination: insufficient prevention, outstanding management, very deficient communication

On July 30 and 31, the irregular entry of some 80,000 migrants occurred in the autonomous city of Ceuta, which practically meant the doubling of its population (83,595 inhabitants, according to the INE). The management of the crisis by the Government of Spain has been phased:

· In a first, diplomatic phase, the contacts of Foreign Affairs with the Government of Morocco allowed their full collaboration for the hot return (during the first 72 hours) of 73,500 migrants (according to the National Police).

In this phase, the meeting of the 27 EU Interior Ministers was promoted, who applauded the Government's good initial management, aborting the attempt by Giorgia Meloni's Italy - which had been supported by up to 22 European countries - to annul the effects of the Schengen free mobility treaty, an initiative in which it finally stood alone and received in retaliation the same selective annulment by Spain. A proportional and logical measure, given that through Lampedusa, in Italy, three times as many irregular migrants have entered this year alone as through Ceuta.

Europe also recognized that the massive regularization undertaken by the Government had not caused any pull effect in this wave, and Pedro Sanchez visited the autonomous city, achieving a first success applauded by the New York Times but which, however, did not entirely resolve the situation in Ceuta.

· The second phase in terms of management has been dedicated to the consequences of the crisis on the humanitarian situation of minors, the reinforcement of security and the circumstances of the elderly who did not return (estimated at around 8,000).

The priority in this phase was unaccompanied minors, of whom 2,900 have been identified and located, more than 2,500 have been registered at police stations, and girls and adolescents in this group have been housed in dignified conditions. The situation of minors is the most urgent and sensitive, and legislation makes it necessary to identify them one by one and for the Public Prosecutor's Office to have certain and certified knowledge that they will not face a situation contrary to the human rights of children in their country. In this regard, full collaboration with Morocco, which claims them, has been activated for the location of their families (when they are still alive) and the imminent transfer of a first contingent of 500 girls to other communities to avoid collapse in Ceuta, whose minor reception quota is limited to 29 places. 25 million euros were also allocated, which the Council of Ministers on Tuesday, August 25, approved to transfer to Ceuta to care for these minors while their situation is resolved, which will end with most of them reuniting with their families.

Regarding security, Foreign Affairs coordinated with Morocco the reinforcement of its borders, which was key, with the deployment of more than 2,000 troops on the Moroccan side, to prevent a second attempt by civilians to enter, while Defense deployed 3,000 military personnel and Interior coordinated the operation by contributing 955 new civil guards and 922 national police officers. Despite the increase in complaints to 200 daily, there are only 21 cases of incarcerated migrants and the transfers - both the initial massive return to Morocco and the internal ones - have taken place without notable incidents. The reaction of Robles' cabinet after the initial complaints from the military about their accommodation or sustenance was also quick and effective, and the military are now satisfied with their personal situation.

Regarding unaccompanied minors, the main obstacle was the lack of suitable locations, which led many (mostly sub-Saharan) to stay on beaches, in the mountains, or scattered through the streets of Ceuta's periphery. The most notable step was, as announced by the Minister of Migration, Elma Sáiz, the provision of buildings with capacity to accommodate 1,500 people, the first of which has already been conditioned by the Army and has allowed the identification and rehousing of immigrants who were staying in makeshift tents on Trampolín Beach. While asylum requests are resolved and the rest of the displaced migrants are identified, it is necessary to count on and prepare sports centers and military facilities, the first relevant decision of the new single command that will manage the third phase, assuming both ministerial and Autonomous City competencies.

In this area, the Ministry of Health, after overcoming the initial collapse (1,700 hospital consultations and 439 emergencies attended in the first two days, compared to the current 200-300 consultations and 120 emergencies) has opted for a preventive policy and secured the transfer of 45,000 vaccines (15,000 triple viral, 10,000 diphtheria/tetanus, 10,000 polio, and 10,000 chickenpox) that will help prevent infectious diseases.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice, from the beginning, reinforced the staffing of the courts of first instance and the public defender's office, as well as increasing the operational capacity of the Institute of Legal Medicine by 176%. In addition, it urged the General Council of the Judiciary to provide whatever reinforcements are needed when requested, something that the CGPJ has not yet done.

· The third phase begins now with the celebration on Tuesday 25 of the National Security Council and the Extraordinary Council of Ministers and the delegation of the single command, embodied in the figure of minister Ángel Víctor Torres, who was already responsible for the migration commission and has experience in other crises related to migrants, such as the Canary Islands one. In this phase, economic support will materialize, both the 25 million already approved for the care of minors, and the 6.5 million dedicated to humanitarian aid (where the cooperation of NGOs such as the Red Cross is being crucial), as well as, above all, the extraordinary funds announced by minister Carlos Cuerpo and by the European Union itself for the crisis, which will far exceed 180 million euros. The third phase will be decisive in the orderly repatriations of migrants still in the city, both minors and adults, for which Morocco's collaboration will continue to be vital.

Deficient foresight and communication    

The good management carried out by the Government, despite weak collaboration from the Ceuta executive regarding the rapid cession of locations (the Ceuta government has refused to use populated locations in the city to temporarily house immigrants), the location of minors (which was under its jurisdiction until the single command was decreed) or the management of public health after the scabies outbreaks detected due to overcrowding circumstances, has not been accompanied by adequate foresight or good communication.

Regarding foresight, it is shocking that, despite the increase in irregular entries detected around July 15 (two weeks before the massive entry), recognized by the FCSE beforehand, and even by Morocco itself, which attributed it to the recent Supreme Court ruling prohibiting hot returns to those who entered by sea, neither border security nor the preparation of the Autonomous City to manage the humanitarian consequences were reinforced.

Communication has been marred by symbolic elements that have opened a flank to political criticism: despite the parade of ministers through Ceuta who have been announcing the measures taken, and the two interministerial telematic meetings led by the President of the Government, Pedro Sánchez, after passing through Ceuta at the beginning of the crisis, his vacation retreat in La Mareta has been the target of criticism from the opposition.

The second focus of communicative errors occurred between the ministers of Interior, Marlaska, and Defense, Robles, regarding whether or not they had intelligence reports that would have allowed them to prevent it. What could have been a simple matter if both had agreed that there was information regarding the upturn in migrant arrivals, but not regarding their extraordinary dimension, became an apparent contradiction between both ministries which, however, have coordinated very well in the joint deployment of military personnel and FCSE.

Finally, the human aspect of providing closeness to the people of Ceuta in one of the most exceptional Augusts in their history was only represented by Minister Robles, who, despite the shouts and criticisms with which she was received, knew how to approach and dialogue with them, thus reducing their feeling of “being abandoned,” something very often repeated by citizens. While this aspect had no impact on the management carried out, it does, however, have a notable communicative effect that other ministers have not been able to replicate.

In conclusion, a crisis well managed in its three phases can detract from the Government's prestige due to errors in foresight and political communication.